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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Nicholas Negroponte, founding Director of the Media
Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, wrote Being Digi-
tal, a compilation of his thoughts on the transition from a world of
atoms to a world of bits. He took for granted the lesser transition
from analog representation and transmission of information to its
digital representation and transmission. He wrote, "[t]he informa-
tion superhighway is about the global movement of weightless bits
at the speed of light."' According to Negroponte, the transforma-
tion was inevitable: "The change from atoms to bits is irrevocable
and unstoppable."
2
Nonetheless, when Congress finally enacted the long-awaited
reform of our nation's telecommunications law in 1996, it was
t State Senator for the State of Minnesota, District 44. Senator Kelley is a
member of the Telecommunications Committee. He is a graduate of Columbia
University Law School.
1. NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGrrAL 12 (1995).
2. Id. at4.
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caught trying to hold back the tide. Even though the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 (hereinafter "the Act") was hailed as the
regulatory reform needed for the digital age, the Act failed to em-
body fully Negroponte's assertion that "bits are bits."' The Act's
definitions contain technological and marketplace anachronisms
inconsistent with the direction of the telecommunications industry
then and now. For example, one of the marketplace consequences
of the transition to being digital is the integration of multiple ser-
vices such as telephone, cable, mobile wireless, Internet access, and
long distance. Formerly, these services were offered principally
through separate providers for each service; in the future they will
be provided as a cluster of integrated services offered by each pro-
vider, hopefully in competition with the integrated offerings of one
or more other providers. Congress was imperfect in their recogni-
tion of our digital and integrated future and this is revealed in
those flawed definitions. The flaws create internal conceptual
problems, interpretive difficulties for the Federal Communications
Commission (hereinafter "FCC") and the courts, policy-making
problems for states, and implementation challenges at multiple
levels of government and industry.
While Congress should have foreseen the direction of techno-
logical and marketplace change, the focus now should be on what
Congress can do to better position the United States for a future in
which integrated telecommunications service providers compete
with each other to deliver a wide range of digital services to cus-
tomers.
Local and long distance telephone companies, wireless com-
panies, cable operators and Internet service providers (hereinafter
"ISPs"), as well as other types of providers who may come on the
scene, should all be defined as telecommunications services pro-
viders to the extent they constitute physical links in the transmis-
sion or transport of information. While it may be necessary to rec-
oguize some of the legacy definitions during a transition to a new,
integrated regulatory system, Congress must point the way to an in-
tegrated digital future. Congress must also clearly differentiate the
provision of content from the provision of transport. The assertion
that all telecommunications service providers, including ISPs,
should be regulated uniformly is not an assertion that the degree of
regulation should be the same as in the past. It will not be possible
3. Id. at9.
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT DEFINITIONS
for Congress to accomplish two goals of the Act; more competition,
and non-discrimination among telecommunications technologies;
unless it changes the definitions to reflect the technological and
marketplace integration that continues to occur.
Though the Act's relatively recent passage might deter Con-
gress from revisiting telecommunications reform, Congress ought
to act promptly to fix the problems that have arisen from its failure
to see how thoroughly our world is being transformed by the "ir-
revocable and unstoppable" transition to being digital.
II. GOALS OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
The Act was intended to "provide for a pro-competitive, de-
regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly
private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and in-
formation technologies and services to all Americans by opening all
telecommunications markets to competition .... , Congress wanted
more competition in telecommunications in order to speed up
provision of advanced technologies
5 and impart other benefits.
6
Congress believed that telephone company competition with cable
companies in the cable television business would enable consumers
to benefit from lower rates, better quality service, improved main-
tenance and a larger diversity of new information services.7 Con-
gress also anticipated that cable companies would provide facilities
based competition to incumbent telephone companies."
To achieve a competitive marketplace, Congress also had to
prevent discrimination among competing providers. The House
committee discussed section 243(e), which prohibits a local gov-
ernment from imposing a franchise fee or its equivalent for access
to public rights-of-way in any manner that discriminates among
providers of telecommunications services. 9 The committee stated:
The purpose of this provision is to create a level playing
field for the development of competitive telecommunica-
tions networks. Harmonizing the assessment of fees from
all providers is one means of creating this parity. It is not
4. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
124, 124.
5. Id. at 104-204, at 48 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 11.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 77, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 43.
9. Id. at 75, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 41.
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the intent of the Committee to deny local governments
their authority to impose franchise fees, but rather simply
to require such fees be imposed in a non-discriminatory
manner.
The Congressional goal of preventing discrimination in the
new markets appears throughout the Act. The Senate's section
254(b), which became part of the Act, "preserves a State's authority
to impose, on a competitively neutral basis, requirements to ad-
vance universal service and other public goals."" Inter-connection
requirements were intended "to promote non-discriminatory access
to telecommunications networks" for users and vendors.
12
Congress also expanded the FCC's authority to regulate the
rates at which telecommunications companies obtained rights to
attach to utility poles. Section 224(f) (1) mandates that a utility
provide a cable system "telecommunications carrier with non-
discriminatory access to any pole, duct, conduit or right-of-way
owned or controlled by it.", 3 Competition and non-discrimination
were inextricably linked in the Act.
III. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
In the Act, Congress subdivided the business of moving bits
into three broad categories of defined services: telecommunica-
tions services, cable services and information services. Other defi-
nition divisions do exist, including "wire communication," radio
communication and "open video system." However, the focus of
this discussion will be the three broad divisions laid out in the Act.
A. Telecommunications Services
At least in common use, "telecommunications services" is po-
tentially the broadest of the three definitions. Indeed, in some
places in the Act, the term "telecommunications" is used to en-
compass cable 14 and information services.15 " [T] elecommunication
services means the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly
to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available
10. Id.
11. H.R. CON. REP. No. 104-458 at 126, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 138.
12. Id. at 135, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 147.
13. 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(1)(2000).
14. Id. § 522(6) (A) & (B).
15. Id. § 153(20).
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directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used."'
16
"'[T]elecommunications' means the transmission, between or
among points specified by the user, of information of the user's
choosing, without change in the form or content of the informa-
tion as sent and received."" It is worthwhile to consider the appli-
cation of these two definitions to a common transaction.
No one questions that Congress intended the term "telecom-
munications" to apply to telephones. It does so in a relatively
straightforward way. The user or customer picks up a telephone
and dials, or punches in, a number. At that point the user has satis-
fied the first half of the definition; she has specified the points be-
tween which the transmission will occur. The first point is the loca-
tion of the telephone she picked up and the second point is the
one defined by the number she dialed. It is not required that she
know where in physical terms the second point is located. After the
connection is established, the user engages in spoken or other
communication, thus defining the "information of the user's
choosing" that is being transmitted.
Obviously, the called user may respond with information of his
choosing, though it may not be information specifically chosen by
the first user, except in the sense that the first user stimulated the
transmission by the other user by initiating the telephone call.
Both users sent and received information without changing the
form or content of the information. The only qualifier is that al-
though telephone handsets are historically analog, more telephone
companies are using digital switches and other devices and may
convert the analog signal from that format to digital for transmis-
sion and then back to analog for receipt at the other end of the cir-
cuit.
To see where conceptual difficulties might arise, consider how
an Internet transmission might be conducted. A user sitting at her
computer with an active connection to the Internet opens her elec-
tronic mail program and types into the address field the email ad-
dress of another user. She has now specified the points between
which the communication will be transmitted. She types in her
message and properly sends the message from her computer.
When the recipient of the message opens it, the message has the
same form and content it had when sent. "Telecommunications"
16. Id. § 153(46).
17. Id. § 153(43).
20011 2141
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happened, even though the users used no telephone-like device.
Therefore, is Internet service "telecommunications" defined by
the Act? Also, which entities in the example transaction provided
"telecommunications services?" These questions are discussed
later.
B. Cable Services
Under the Act, "cable service" means "the one-way transmis-
sion to subscribers of: (i) video programming, or (ii) other pro-
gramming service, and subscriber interaction, if any, which is re-
quired for the selection or use of such video programming or other
programming service."' 8 "Video programming means program-
ming provided by, or generally considered comparable to pro-
gramming provided by, a television broadcast station." 9 " [0] ther
programming service means information that a cable operator
makes available to all subscribers generally."
20
Reading these definitions on the surface one could reasonably
ask why America Online (hereinafter "AOL") is not a cable service,
to the extent it provides video content or programming transmitted
to its subscribers as a result of subscriber interaction to select or use
the programming. The reference to programming provided by a
television broadcast station may not be a significant limitation since
many television stations now have Internet sites with their pro-
gramming available for viewing over the Internet. Had Congress
used the term "broadcast" by a television station instead of "pro-
vided," the apparent applicability of the definition of "cable ser-
vice" to AOL would be harder to defend.
Of course, there is more to statutory interpretation than an
observation on the surface. The words used by Congress might
have broader application than is commonly thought. At least one
court has made the point that the prospect of providing video pro-
gramming on computers connected through the Internet was not
part of Congressional deliberations at the time these definitions
were drafted in 1978.2' At that time, companies like AOL did not
exist. Consequently, it is hard to argue that Congress intended in
18. 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (A) (1994), amended by 47 U.S.C. § 522 (6) (B) (Supp. II
1996). The Act changed the definition only by adding "or use" after "selection."
19. Id. § 522(20) (1994 & Supp. I 1996).
20. Id. § 522(14).
21. Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000). This court
has cautioned against reading too much into this expansion. Id.
2142 [Vol. 27:4
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1978 to regulate AOL as a provider of cable service.
Yet in 1996, Congress amended the definition inserting the
words "or use" in connection with the role of customer interac-
22tion. Although this small change might not provide sufficient lev-
erage to bring AOL within the scope of the definition of cable ser-
vice or cable operator, a FCC staff working paper did suggest that
cable-provided Internet services, when provided by a cable operator
over its cable system in its service area, could fall within the defini-
tion of "cable services. 2 ' As that working paper concluded, it will
be increasingly difficult to maintain that particular facilities and
services are "cable" as opposed to "telecommunications."
24
C. Information Services
"Information services" means the "offering of a capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving,
utilizing or making available information via telecommunications
and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of
such capability for the management, control or operation of a tele-
communications service."25
Although the opinion that Internet service providers are "in-
formation services" providers within the meaning of the Act ap-
26pears to be widely held, this opinion raises issues and contains
problems that deserve attention here because they relate to the
overall theme.
The opinion that ISPs fall in the category of providing "infor-
mation services" is too simplistic. It fails to account for the variety
in business models of ISPs and the reality of changes in Internet
service and basic telephone service. One court has recognized that
one entity, a cable operator, could be providing both a "telecom-
munications service" and "information services" without very clearly
, 27identifying where one role ends and the other begins.
22. 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (B) (1996).
23. BARBARA ESBIN, INTERNET OVER CABLE: DEFINING THE FUTURE IN TERMS OF
THE PAST 74 (Fed. Communications Comm'n, Working Paper No. 30,1998) (citing
Texas Utils. Elec. Co. v. FCC, 997 F.2d 925, 932-35 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
24. Id.
25. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20)(1996).
26. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating
that the FCC considers the ISP as providing "information services" under the Act);
Gulf Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1277; ESBIN, supra note 23.
27. AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d at 878 (analyzing the express terms of 47 U.S.C. §
541 (b) (3)).
2001] 2143
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Think of Internet access as occurring through the provision of
multiple layers of services: the physical layer that transports an elec-
tronic signal; the operational layer that depends on control soft-
ware like the TCP/IP protocols and information directories that
cross reference uniform resource locators ("URLs") and IP ad-
dresses; the application layer that uses software that formats infor-
mation such as hypertext markup language and Java; and the con-
tent layer that contains Yahoo maps, online magazines and an
almost infinite array of subject matter. A case can and should be
made that the application and content layers fit the definition of
"information services" while the physical and operational layers be-
have much more like "telecommunications services."
At the physical and operational layer, an Internet transaction
might happen as follows: The user at her computer opens a
browser, types in a URL (domain name), and hits Enter. The
computer's central processor sends a digital bundle of information
electronically to a modem which converts the data to the analog
format required by the local transmission facility, most commonly a
local telephone company. The bundle is transported to the local
telephone central office where it passes through a switch and is
routed to a circuit, probably copper wire, connected (directly or
indirectly) to the office of the Internet service provider. The tele-
phone company uses software and information that is specifically
defined as "telecommunications services" to route the bundle.
At the premises of the ISP, a wire owned by the ISP picks up
the bundle from the telephone company and transports it to an
electronic device that may be a switch, a router or a server that then
routes it through another transmission medium, which might be
copper or optical fiber, to another server in the networked system
of computers that is the Internet. The ISP does not change the
form or content of the bundle except possibly by converting the
analog signal from the telephone company to a digital signal using
its own modems. If the user sent the signal using a digital sub-
scriber line or another digital service, no transformation was neces-
sary.
The ISP does apply software and information at the opera-
tional layer to identify the Internet protocol address of the desired
host computer in order to route the bundle correctly. When the
bundle arrives at the host computer sought by the user, a bundle
containing the hypertext markup language code or other format-
ting code for the Internet site designated by the URL is sent back
2144 [Vol. 27:4
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by a similar process to the user's computer.
The entity operating the host computer is clearly providing an
"information service" since it is offering a capability for storing and
retrieving information available via telecommunications. What is
less clear is whether the ISP in this transaction engaged in anything
that could be characterized as an "information service." The ISP
used its capability to store, process and retrieve information only
for the control or operation of the service of transmitting a bundle
of bits. This service looks a lot like a telecommunications service,
especially since there was no change in the form or content of the
information being transmitted. Thanks to hypertext markup lan-
guage and its cousins, the Web page the user received looked just
the way its designer had designed it to look.
Another angle for thinking about the definition and policy is-
sues on this topic is found in the definition and exclusions for
"electronic publishing." The term "information services" specifi-
cally includes "electronic publishing" which is defined to mean:
The dissemination, provision, publication, or sale to an
unaffiliated entity or person, of any one or more of the
following: news (including sports); entertainment (other
than interactive games); business, financial, legal, con-
sumer or credit materials; editorials, columns, or features;
advertising; photos or images; archival or research mate-
rial; legal notices or public records; scientific, educational,
instructional, technical, professional, trade, or other liter-
28ary materials; or other like or similar information.
Congress defined the term in order to control the ability of
Bell operating companies to extend their monopoly service in tele-
phone to gain leverage in electronic publishing. Like other defini-
tions at issue in this discussion, it was a relic of the modification of
Final Judgment which broke up AT&T.2 From the definition, it
appears that every Internet site (except ones providing interactive
games) is engaged in electronic publishing. The term "electronic
publishing," as defined, excludes "the transmission of information
as a common carrier,"30 data processing or transaction processing
services that do not involve the generation or alteration of the con-
tent of information,5 ' or any other network services that do not in-
28. 47 U.S.C. § 274(h)(1)(1996).
29. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131,179 (D.D.C. 1982).
30. Id. § 274(h)(2)(B).
31. Id. at (h)(2)(E).
2001] 2145
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volve the generation or alteration of the content,32 among numer-
ous specific exclusions. The common element among many of the
exclusions points to the conclusion that if a service does not involve
the generation or alteration of content, it is not electronic publish-
ing and would not, on that ground alone, be an information ser-
vice.
One of the exceptions to the definition of electronic publish-
ing deserves special mention. "Electronic publishing" does not in-
clude a gateway to an information service that does not involve the
generation or alteration of the content of information, including
data transmission, address translation, protocol conversion, billing
management, introductory content, and navigational systems that
enable users to access electronic publishing services, which do not
affect the presentation of such electronic publishing services to us-
33ers.
Since ISPs provide a gateway that does not involve generating
or altering information content, and they do it through data
transmission, address translation, protocol conversion and naviga-
tional systems, they are not electronic publishers. This exclusion is
in the same exclusion list as "the provision of information necessary
for management, control, or operation of a telephone company
telecommunications system.34
As discussed below, one reason the FCC defines ISPs as "in-
formation services" providers, despite the uncomfortable fit with
the statutory definitions, is that this category is the only one that
would not subject ISPs to the complex set of regulations attendant
to being defined as telecommunications services or cable services.
It is reasonable to conclude that Congress did not want ISPs regu-
lated like telephone companies or cable operators. Given that
likely intent, Congress did not leave the FCC or the courts any
other choices. Instead of recognizing fully the changing telecom-
munications landscape in front of it, Congress tried to shoehorn
the whole industry into three ill-defined boxes. Hence, ISPs are
slotted into information services without much analysis of the im-
pact on the viability of the other definitions of including ISPs in
that definition. For example, as more and more services such as
voice and video transmission are delivered in digital format using
Internet protocol or its successors, ISPs could subsume both cable
32. Id. § 274(h)(2)(M).
33. Id. at (h)(2)(C).
34. Id. at (h)(2)(H).
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and telephone without being regulated on the same footing as
their competitors. The FCC's interpretations may be appropriate
as short term policy expedients but they relieve Congress from de-
ciding critical issues and then describing its intent accurately in
statute.
IV. HISTORY BY DEFINITION
Although the 1996 Act was intended to be a major change
from the previous approach to regulation, it could not entirely
shed the effects of history. One of the reasons that the definitions
in the Act could not reflect fully a "bits are bits" future was that
Congress based the new definitions on those set out in a decade-old
court decision. The FCC compounded the anachronistic effect by
interpreting the 1996 definitions to fit definitions it had formulated
as early as 1980 .2 It is almost no wonder that the Act definitions fit
our current conditions so poorly.
The first relevant definitions appeared in an FCC decision, re-
ferred to as Computer II, which dealt with the convergence of com-
munication and data processing technologies. " In Computer II, the
FCC classified all services offered over a telecommunications net-
work as either basic or enhanced. Basic services consisted of the of-
fering, on a common carrier basis, of "transmission capacity for the
movement of information."3 The FCC also described basic service
as the offering of "pure transmission capability over a communica-
tions path that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction
with customer supplied information."8
35. The FCC analyzed the history of these definitions in a report to Congress
dated April, 10 1998. In the Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Ser-
vice, 13 F.C.C.R. 11, 516, 33-54 (1998). The FCC report was issued in response
to a mandate from Congress contained in the Appropriations Act for 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-19, § 623, 111 Stat. 2440, 2521-22 (1997). Congress asked for a detailed
description of the extent to which the FCC's interpretations of the Act definitions
were consistent with the plain language of the Act. Id. They specifically wanted a
review of how the interpretations affected universal service and the consistency of
the FCC's application of its interpretations of the Act's definitions. Id.
36. In re Amendment of § 64.702 et. seq. of the Commission's Rules & Regu-
lations, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (Computer Ifinal decision); on reconsideration 84
F.C.C.2d 50 (1980) (Computer II reconsidered decision); 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981)
(Computer II further reconsidered decision), affd, Computer & Comm. Indus.
Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
37. In re Amendment of § 64.702 et. seq. of the Commission's Rules & Regu-
lations, 77 F.C.C.2d at 419.
38. Id. at 420.
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Enhanced services, on the other hand, were defined as "any of-
fering over the telecommunications network which is more than a
basic transmission service," including, "services offered over com-
mon carrier transmission facilities used in interstate communica-
tions, which employ computer processing applications that act on
the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the sub-
scriber's transmitted information; provide the subscriber addi-
tional, different, or restructured information; or involve subscriber
interaction with stored information. 3 9  Since enhanced services
were any service that was not basic, these definitions were mutually
exclusive. They did not overlap.
Basic services were regulated under Title II of the Communica-
tions Act because they involved transmission. 4° Enhanced services
were not regulated because they were offered "over common car-
rier transmission facilities," and because the FCC did not want to
impose regulation on a fast-moving and competitive market.41
The consent decree entered on August 11, 1982, settling the
United States government's antitrust suit against AT&T with the di-
vestiture of the Bell Operating Companies, spelled out the next
42significant set of definitions. In this consent decree, commonly
referred to as the Modification of Final Judgment or MFJ, the court
distinguished between "telecommunications" and "information"
services, for the purpose of permitting the Bell Operating Compa-
nies to provide telecommunications but not information services.
"Telecommunications" was defined to mean the transmission,
between or among points specified by the user, of information of
the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the
information as sent and received, by means of electromagnetic
transmission medium, including all instrumentalities, facilities, ap-
paratus, and services (including the collection, storage, forwarding,
switching, and delivery of such information) essential to such
transmission.
Congress derived its definitions of telecommunications almost
verbatim from the MFJ. Congress did delete the reference to "all
instrumentalities, facilities apparatus and services" and the accom-
39. Id.
40. Computer & Comm. Indus. Ass'n, 693 F.2d at 210.
41. In re Federal-State joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11, 513,
26 (1998).
42. See generally United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C.
1982).
43. Id. at 230.
2148 [Vol. 27:4
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panying parenthetical. One question that will appear later is
whether the deletion of the reference to "storage" and "forward-
ing," was intended to signal that Congress was narrowing the defi-
nition of telecommunications from the scope of the MFJ.
The court defined "information service" to mean the offering
of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information
which may be conveyed via telecommunications, except that such
service does not include any use of such capability for the man-
agement, control, or operation of a telecommunication system or
the management of a telecommunication service."4
Again, these two definitions were intended to be exclusive be-
cause the Bell Operating Companies could do telecommunications
but not information services. Note, however, that the function of
"storage" or "storing" was an element in both definitions.
Although the focus of this analysis is not the FCC's interpreta-
tions of Congressional definitions, it is difficult to discuss the cur-
rent predicament, especially the interpretive efforts of courts, with-
out a brief look at the FCC's approach. It is appropriate to digress
briefly here as part of the history of the Act definitions.
The FCC has concluded that its 1980 definition of enhanced
services should be interpreted to apply to the same functions as
those covered by the Congressional definition of "information ser-
vices," which was worded differently.45 In several decisions cited in
the Report to Congress, the FCC said that entities providing "en-
hanced or information services," including Internet access services,
were not providing "telecommunications." The argument was
that Internet access involved protocol conversion and interaction
with stored data so that it required information services rather than
the pure transmission of information.47
It is only fair to recognize that the FCC did not have much in
the way of choices. If it concluded that much of what Internet ac-
cess providers did was pure "telecommunications," it would have
had to conclude that Internet access providers were subject to the
same regulations as telephone companies, including, potentially,
price regulation. The FCC said as much in its report:
44. Id. at 229.
45. In re Federal-State joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11, 516,
33 (1998).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 11,520,1 39.
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An approach in which a broad range of information ser-
vices providers are simultaneously classed as telecommu-
nications carriers, and thus presumptively subject to the
broad range of Title II constraints, could seriously curtail
the regulatory freedom that the Commission concluded in
Computer H was important to the healthy and competitive
481development of the enhanced-services industry.
In the face of arguments that if the FCC determined that Inter-
net access was telecommunications, Congress had specifically au-
thorized the FCC to forbear from regulation, the FCC decided that
uncertainty about the lasting nature of such forbearance could chill
innovation. The FCC also had on its side the almost complete lack
of any clue that Congress had intended Internet access to be in-
cluded in the definition of "telecommunications," except for the
breadth of the definition itself.
At the same time that the FCC was vigorously defending its in-
terpretations, it also recognized some of the paradoxes it created.
It noted the existence of hybrid services in which a provider offered
information services and, as an inseparable part of that service
transmitted information supplied or requested by the user.49 The
FCC believed that not treating telecommunications and informa-
tion services as mutually exclusive would lead to the conclusion that
all such services were telecommunication services.5 ° (It was right.)
Hence, the FCC theorized that an ISP that owned transmission
facilities was selling telecommunications to itself rather than to the
public, and could be classed as a non-common carrier not subject
to regulation as a telecommunications carrier. The FCC did not
discuss the possibility that, from the customer's viewpoint, all the
services comprised a bundle being sold to her directly.
The FCC's definitions also caused problems in dealing with
Internet protocol (hereinafter "IP") telephony.5' IP telephony
permits real-time voice transmission using Internet protocols. The
FCC distinguished "computer-to-computer" IP telephony, in which
the customer uses her own customer premises computer, from
"phone-to-phone" IP telephony, in which the customer uses a con-
ventional instrument for making a touch-tone call. One of the fac-
tors supporting the distinction was the observation that, in the
48. Id. at 11,5424, 1 46.
49. Id. at 11,529, 7 56-57.
50. Id. at 11,529, 57.
51. Id. at 11541-45, 1 83-93.
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"computer-to-computer" case, the Internet provider might not
know that a voice transmission was occurring because the content
of the packets is indistinguishable. 51 In the "phone-to-phone" case,
the provider had to hold itself out as providing voice telephony.
Since it is not too hard to imagine an Internet services provider
touting the advantages of IP telephony as part of the sales pitch to a
customer of the "computer-to-computer" variety, this element of
the distinction is disingenuous. Consequently, the key feature that
would make "phone-to-phone" IP telephony "telecommunications"
was whether the service required the customer to have on her
premises a device different from a touch-tone telephone. 3
Why it matters that the computer, that must be part of any IP
telephony transaction, should be at the home of a customer, possi-
bly with an Ethernet handset attached (which in its outward ap-
pearance and function is the same as a touch-tone telephone),
rather than at the office of the service provider, is a serious ques-
tion. Earlier in the Report, the FCC approved of analyzing func-
tion rather than facilities. 4 It said:
This functional approach is consistent with Congress's di-
rection that the classification of a provider should not de-
pend on the type of facilities used. A telecommunications
service is a telecommunication service regardless of
whether it is provided using wireline, wireless, cable, satel-
lite, or some other infrastructure. Its classification de-
pends rather on the nature of the service being offered to
55customers.
By suggesting that the classification of IP telephony depended
in any way on the type of customer premises facility being used, the
FCC departed without rationale from the sensible approach this
quotation described.
The purpose of this discussion has not been to critique the
FCC or its decisions. Rather it has been to demonstrate through a
brief outline of the FCC's struggles, the anomalies created by the
definitions Congress adopted in the Act. The report to Congress
noted the comments of several Senators who were urging the FCC
to adopt a more expansive interpretation of the definition of tele-
52. Id. at 11,543 87.
53. Id. at 11,543-44, 1 88.
54. Id. at 11,530 59.
55. Id.
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communications. 5r They were attempting to persuade the FCC to
do something Congress itself had the opportunity to do but had
failed to act upon. Instead of fixing the problems by interpreta-
tion, Congress should fix the definitions.
V. JUDICIAL CONFLICTS IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The question of where Internet service providers fit in the
statutory scheme of the Act has divided two circuit courts of appeal.
In April, 2000, the Eleventh Circuit, dealing with the FCC's author-
ity to regulate pole attachments, ruled that Internet service is nei-
ther a telecommunications service nor a cable service. 57 If any-
thing, it was an information service as the FCC had suggested in an
order relating to universal service. In June, 2000, the Ninth Cir-
cuit faced the issue whether a city, acting in the course of approv-
ing an acquisition, could require a cable company offering broad-
band Internet service to open its facilities to competing providers
of Internet service.59 The court held that broadband Internet ser-
vice provided by a cable operator was a telecommunications service
and, therefore, not subject to regulation by a city."° The Ninth Cir-
cuit ruling did not recognize the earlier Eleventh Circuit ruling.
Unless Congress fixes the definitions at issue, the Supreme Court
will ultimately have to decide which court was correct.
These two cases provide useful lessons on the difficulty Con-
gress has created and warrant further discussion. Since the Ninth
Circuit seemed to have a better grasp of the practical aspects of
Internet service, it will be the starting point.
Despite the different conclusions reached, there were some
points of agreement in the analysis. The Ninth Circuit agreed with
the Eleventh Circuit that Internet service is not "cable service."
6
1
The two courts also agreed that the typical ISP is an "information
service" within the meaning of the Act.62 In reaching this conclu-
sion, both courts relied on FCC statements contained in proceed-
56. See e.g., id. at 11,517-18, 1 34-35 and accompanying notes.
57. Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1275-78 (l1th Cir. 2000), cert
granted in part by F.C.C. v. Gulf Power Co., 121 S.Ct. 879, 69 USLW 3383 (U.S.Jan
22, 2001) (NO. 00-843).
58. Id.
59. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877-80 (9th Cir. 2000).
60. Id. at 880.
61. Id. at 877.
62. Id.; Gulf Power, 208 F.3d at 1277.
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ings involving universal service.63 The validity of relying on state-
ments made in that context will be discussed later.
The Ninth Circuit's decision turned on the fact that the
@Home Internet service which AT&T would provide was different
than conventional ISPs. The court wrote:
[U] nlike other ISPs, @Home controls all of the transmis-
sion facilities between its subscribers and the Internet. To
the extent @Home is a conventional ISP, its activities are
that of an information service. However, to the extent
that @Home provides its subscribers Internet transmission
over its cable broadband facility, it is providing a tele-
communications service as defined in the Communica-
tions Act.6
The court observed that @Home was like other ISPs in that its
service had two elements: a "pipeline" (cable broadband instead of
telephone lines) and the Internet service transmitted through that
pipeline.65 The difference was the extent of control over the trans-
mission facilities.66
The Ninth Circuit panel did not have to face the question of
how much or how little of the "pipeline" a cable broadband ISP
would have to control before its conclusion would change. Simi-
larly, it did not have to address whether an ISP that transmitted
Internet service over a "pipeline" based on telephone wires that it
controlled in whole or in part was a telecommunications service
because of that control. The potential for some gradation or varia-
tion in how ISPs provide their service was obscured by the court's
dichotomy between a "conventional" ISP and @Home's total con-
trol of the transmission facilities leading to the intersection with
the Internet.67
It is doubtful that a meaningful distinction could arise from
@Home's ownership of the lines. In "telecommunications services"
Congress expressly anticipated an incumbent telephone company
leasing or reselling use of its facilities to competitors that would not
63. In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,501,
11,532, 1 66 (1998), 1998 WL 166178 (report to Congress); In re Implementation
of Section 703(E) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 13 F.C.C.R. 6777, 6795,
1 34, (1998), 1998 WL 46987; In re Fed.-StateJoint Board on Universal Service, 12
F.C.C.R. 87, 123 1 69 (1996), 1996 WL 656113.
64. AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d at 878.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 877-78. The court referred to "conventional" ISPs several times. Id.
The court also mentioned a "typical ISP." Id. at 874.
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own them.68 The lessee which then sold transmission services to its
customers would be no less in the business of providing "telecom-
munications services"just because it did not own the lines. Despite
that concept, the court described a "typical ISP" as one that "con-
nects with the Internet via leased telecommunication lines, which
its consumers access through 'dial-up' connections over ordinary
telephone lines."69 Certainly, there are ISPs that provide service in
the manner described by the court. It is not hard to identify varia-
tions from this model that call into question the very notion of a
"typical" or "conventional" ISP.
For example, assume a company that provides high-speed digi-
tal subscriber line (hereinafter "DSL") service in competition with
an incumbent Bell operating company like Qwest. To serve a resi-
dential customer in Qwest's territory, the ISP provides or sells to
the customer a DSL modem. The modem transmits its signal over
a portion of a line leased from Qwest. Qwest and the ISP would be
engaged in line-sharing, a service Qwest is mandated to provide, at
least in Minnesota. The signal goes to a Qwest central office where
most likely it would be retransmitted on another leased line to the
ISP's own switching facility. If the ISP owns a facility directly con-
nected to the Internet, it controls the remainder of the transmis-
sion pipeline to the Internet. This ownership of a direct connec-
tion between its own switch and the Internet might differentiate
the ISP from many other ISPs. In fact, this ISP could provide an
Internet connection for other ISP's. America Online may lease
lines from telecommunications carriers to bring its dial-up cus-
tomer traffic to its server facilities in Virginia but it is itself a direct
connection to the Internet. In this respect, the biggest ISP of all is
not like a "typical" ISP.
The Ninth Circuit analysis would acknowledge that Qwest's
role in enabling service is "classic 'telecommunications."'" The
ISP's role in providing the transmission between the switch and the
Internet should in a rational system also be recognized as "tele-
communications." The court noted, "[a]s the definition [of "in-
formation services"] suggests, ISPs are themselves users of tele-
communications when they lease lines to transport data on their
own networks and beyond on the Internet backbone."71 It is diffi-
68. 47U.S.C. §541(b)(3).
69. AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d at 874.
70. Id. at 877.
71. Id.
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cult to see why the role of the ISP in the example in providing
transmission for itself would not be "telecommunications" while
transmission on the same facility for others would be so deferred.
One more issue must be considered. The AT&T court said
that @Home was providing telecommunications services because it
controlled the transmission facilities from a customer's premises to
the Internet. 72 Assume then, the existence of an ISP located in a
large office building. One of the attractions of its location is that a
big fiber optic "pipeline" that is part of the Internet backbone
passes just outside the building. The owner of the "pipeline" has
permitted the ISP to connect directly to the backbone from the
ISP's own server. The ISP has a customer in the building so the ISP
has installed its own wires to connect the customer to the ISP's
server and then to the Internet backbone. Like @Home this ISP
controls all the transmission facilities between its subscriber and
the Internet. Even though the facilities are all within one building,
except for the minor distance to the Internet backbone, under the
Ninth Circuit's criteria this ISP is providing telecommunications
service.
This example leads to a question regarding "typical ISPs." To
the extent they own their own wires and a switch or server facility
inside their premises that act as an indispensable link in the trans-
mission facility between the customer and the Internet, are they
not providing "telecommunications?" Even if the conclusion is that
the server enables some conversion of the information protocol
and is thus an information service, the wires connecting the server
to the outside world are indistinguishable from the other elements
of transmission facilities which the AT&T court concluded could
put an ISP in the "telecommunications" business.73
As noted above in the discussion of the definition of informa-
tion services, an ISP is probably providing telecommunications at
the physical and operational layers and information services at
other layers. As a closing note on this extrapolation from the
AT&T court's holding, it is curious that the court could write the
following and still believe that even a "conventional ISP" was only
in the "information services" business. The court stated:
[u]nder the Communications Act, this principle of tele-
communications common carriage governs cable broad-
band as it does other means of Internet transmission such
72. Id. at 878.
73. Id. at 877-78.
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as telephone service and DSL, 'regardless of the facilities
used.' The Internet's protocols themselves manifest a re-
lated principle called "end-to-end": meaning control lies
at the ends of the network where the users are, leaving a
simple network that is neutral with respect to the data it
transmits, like any common carrier. On this rule of the
Internet, the codes of the legislator and the programmer
74
agree.
If an ISP is in the middle of a network in which control lies at
the ends where the users are and the ISP is neutral with respect to
the data it transmits, why is it not doing "telecommunications?"
The Gulf Power case stimulates a different line of analysis. The
court's pithiest statement fully describes its holding. "The '96 Act
allows the Commission to regulate the rates for cable service and
telecommunications service; Internet service is neither."76 The rea-
soning leading to the conclusion that Intemet service is not "cable
service" is similar to the Ninth Circuit panel's. The GulfPower court
did expressly conclude that Congress's addition of "or use" to the
"cable service" definition was not significant enough to sweep
Internet services into the cable service ambit.77
One aspect of the case is particularly noteworthy. The FCC
was a party and argued that Internet service provided by a cable sys-
tem was either "solely cable service" or was subject to regulation
under the FCC's power to determine rates for pole attachments
that are just and reasonable under section 224(b) (1). 78 The court
rejected the second argument on the ground that Congress had
unambiguously given the FCC jurisdiction to regulate pole attach-
79ment rates only for cable service or telecommunications service.
For the FCC to regulate pole attachments for Internet service, it
had to show that the Internet was one or the other of these two
choices. The FCC chose cable and the court disagreed.80
The FCC did not try to argue that Internet service was a tele-
communications service. In the court's view it could not have
made such an argument because the FCC had specifically said that
74. Id. at 879 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(46)).
75. The rates at issue were the rental rates for pole attachments. Gulf Power
Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1266 (11th Cir. 2000).
76. Id. at 1276.
77. Id. at 1276-77.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1276.
80. Id.
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the Internet is not a telecommunications service. The statements it
relied on were drawn from FCC proceedings related to telecom-
munications service. It is important to understand that in the uni-
versal service proceedings, one of the questions at issue was
whether Internet service was a telecommunications service eligible
for support from a universal service fund. The FCC, as well as car-
riers, were wary of reaching that conclusion because it could add
enormously to the costs of such a fund. The FCC might well be-
lieve that Internet service is not inherently a telecommunications
service. It would still be appropriate for a court to hesitate to draw
that conclusion based only on a discussion in the context of univer-
sal service.
The interesting thing about the Gulf Power case is the court's
failure to even consider the competitive consequences of its deci-
sion, so sure was it of the clarity of the statute. Presumably the
court understood that a cable system could provide Internet service
over its cables attached to the electric utility poles at issue. Simi-
larly, a telecommunications carrier could provide Internet service
using DSL technology over the same wire transmitting traditional
telecommunications services like telephone service. The rent
charged to the telecommunications carrier for both the telephone
service and high speed Internet access could be controlled by the
FCC.. If the FCC could not restrain the rent for cable provided
Internet access, the cable competitor would be at a severe competi-
tive disadvantage. The court did not address this issue.
Now suppose that an Internet service provider wants to pro-
vide only Internet service using its own wires rather than those
rented from a telephone company. It might not be a realistic as-
sumption since any rational carrier would want to put as many ser-
vices as possible on a transmission facility. Still, this is a matter of
congressional intent, not economics. The new Internet provider
will be in competition with both the cable-based and telecommuni-
cations-based Internet services. Unlike its competitors, the pure
Internet services company must pay monopoly rents to the owners
of the utility poles; there is no restraint on rents for any aspect of its
services. Its rents cannot be controlled by the FCC under the Gu/f
Power decision. Congress' attempt to achieve non-discriminatory
treatment would have been frustrated.
The Eleventh Circuit panel majority was quite clear about the
intent of Congress: "Congress wanted to allow telecommunications
service providers, like the cable television companies before them,
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to attach to the utilities' bottleneck facilities without having to pay
monopoly rents. 8' The court held that the FCC could not regulate
wireless attachments to poles because utility poles are not bottle-
82neck facilities for wireless systems. Since utility poles are bottle-
neck facilities for wireline Internet service providers, just as much
as they are for cable systems and telecommunications carriers with
whom they might be in competition, it is curious that the court
never wondered whether its interpretation of Congressional intent
was at odds with the congressional goals of increasing competition
and ensuring non-discrimination. The court's decision deters
competitive entry in the Internet service market and enables pole
owners to discriminate among types of Internet service providers.
The irony of the decision is that the court recognized both the in-
creased competition and the non-discrimination goals.8 3
The problem of regulatory or marketplace discrimination that
arises from putting Internet service providers generally in the "in-
formation services" definition relates back to the AT&T decision.
If cable broadband Internet service can be regulated as "telecom-
munications services" but a "conventional ISP" cannot be regulated
because there is no state or FCC regulatory power over "informa-
tion services," there is potential for regulatory discrimination be-
tween entities in competition with each other. Such a situation is
neither fair nor consistent with the goal of encouraging competi-
tion. The less regulated entity is likely to have a decided competi-
tive edge and the regulatory imbalance may deter new entrants
whose business model makes them look more like cable broadband
Internet service providers like @Home.
VI. STATE IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Many of the implementation problems created by Congress
creating an artificial segmentation of telecommunications services
are illuminated by considering the imminent prospect that fixed
wireless companies will enter certain markets in competition with
traditional providers. Fixed wireless services are delivered using a
base station antenna and a customer antenna placed on the outside
of the customer's premises, whether home or office. Under differ-
81. Id. at 1275.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1268 (citing the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub.L.
No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984), and 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)).
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ent business models it has a place in delivering services in both
metropolitan and rural parts of the country. The limitations on its
ability to compete with existing technologies include the require-
ment that the antennas be within line of sight of each other (flat
topographies are good) and weather effects that may degrade the
signal. Though different technologies are being developed, they all
raise similar policy issues. Most of the technologies enable very
high speed transmission of data that could deliver voice, video and
Internet services over one set of facilities.
Imagine a hypothetical place, Anytown, a city in which Wireless
Co. has constructed a new fixed wireless facility on private property.
Unlike a cable system, it is not using public right of way and so is
not defined as a cable system under the Act. Nonetheless, it is de-
livering video programming in competition with the incumbent
cable operator. Though the breadth of the offerings may not be as
great as the cable operator provides, Wireless Co. does not have to
pay a franchise fee to Anytown and does not have the other regula-
tory burdens of the cable company, including the requirement that
it provide free access for public, educational and government pro-
gramming. Wireless Co.'s system was cheaper to construct because
it did not have to lay wire past many homes that would not buy its
service, unlike the cable company. For these reasons, Wireless Co.
is attracting many customers away from the cable company despite
the risks that a snowstorm will occasionally interfere with transmis-
sion. It will not be long before the cable company comes to the
Anytown and state governments seeking regulatory relief so it can
better compete with Wireless Co.
At the same time, Wireless Co. is offering customers high
speed Internet access. It also offers its customers equipment and
software that enables them to make telephone calls over the Inter-
net. It has arranged for gateway services in most parts of the coun-
try, so that a call initiated using Internet protocol at its customer's
end can still connect with a regular telephone through the public
switched telephone network at the receiving end. Since this Inter-
net service is an information service as that term has been defined,
it is not subject to regulation as a telecommunications service.
Consequently, the state public utilities commission has no authority
to ensure the quality of service provided or regulate prices, as it
does with the incumbent telephone company. Wireless Co. did not
even seek a certificate of authority to provide service based on its
lawyer's advice that it was providing an unregulated information
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service. There is no part of Wireless Co.'s system that looks any-
thing like a telephone exchange since no circuit switching occurs,
only packet switching. Wireless Co. also offers a mobile wireless
telephone as part of its package of services and the aggregate price
induces an increasing number of the incumbent telephone com-
pany's customers to conclude they do not need an old style tele-
phone or the related services.
The incumbent cannot, however, lower its price to compete
because it is subject to price regulation. The telephone company
or its customers are also paying a fee or tax to support 911 services,
telecommunications services for communications impaired person
and a subsidy to ensure telephone access for low income customers.
Wireless Co. and its customers are not subject to these charges so
Wireless Co. has another competitive advantage over the telephone
company, similar to its advantage over the cable company derived
from the absence of franchise fees.
When Wireless Co.'s competitors seek relief from city and state
officials, they are likely to be told that there is not much that can be
done because the state and the city have to abide by the framework
Congress established. The government officials might acknowl-
edge that the cable company and telephone company have good
arguments about the unfairness of trying to compete against an un-
regulated company when they are subject to extensive regulation.
They might also recognize that the taxation burdens are inequita-
ble since Wireless Co. does not pay a franchise fee or telecommu-
nications related charges. Nonetheless, lawyers for the state and
the city have told them that if those governments try to define tele-
communications services differently than Congress has, they will be
inviting lawsuits from any number of directions and, of course, in-
curring large legal fees. The city and state officials tell the cable
company and telephone company to take their arguments to Con-
gress. Thinking of how long it took Congress to pass the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, the cable and telephone company
executives despair.
Although some aspects of the above thought experiment may
be strained, it is an accurate description of dilemmas state and local
governments could face in the near future. The technologies exist
and are being deployed. The other potential effect on the incum-
bent providers relates to their decision whether to upgrade their
own systems to provide more services. Although they might decide
to accelerate the provision of new services to forestall Wireless Co.
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from gaining a foothold, it is also possible that they will not invest
in light of the uncertainty and competitive disadvantage they would
still face as a result of the disparity in regulatory treatment of the
three technologies.
VII. CONCLUSION
All of the issues discussed above illustrate the flaws inherent in
the definitions Congress employed in the Act. The definitions are
at odds with the practice of telecommunications as it has developed
since 1996 in ways foreseeable at that time. In addition, the defini-
tions and their interpretation put the regulatory implementation at
cross-purposes with Congressional goals of competition and non-
discrimination. The effort to segment telecommunications ser-
vices, cable services and information services, at least in the way
Congress and the FCC have gone about it, increases the problem of
discrimination among providers in competition with each other
and, consequently, could have the effect of deterring competition.
Congress could move toward fixing these issues by recognizing
that every provider in the business of transporting bits is in the
telecommunications business. Such providers may also be informa-
tion services providers in other aspects of their business. As long as
they move bits, they should be regulated and taxed alike by the
federal as well as state governments. Taking this fairly radical step
is essential to ensuring non-discrimination, more competition and
more investment in advanced services. These are the goals Con-
gress and the country are trying to achieve.
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